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The New Borders of the Constitutional
GAVIN W. ANDERSON *
The key critical constitutional debates of the future are likely—and need—to be very different
from those that animated the Charter’s first thirty years. Since 1982, the borders between
law and politics, rights and utility, and the public and the private have staked out the main
territory contested by critical scholarship. However, these borders now demarcate a
restricted landscape, drawing critics onto the ground of normative debate preferred by
liberal theory, and leading them to propose, at best, a form of moderate pragmatism. A more
promising approach lies in reconnecting constitutional debate to the socio-historical strand
of critical theory, as represented by the emergent school of constitutional sociology, and in
developing this connection in light of the insights of postcolonial studies. The new borders
of the constitutional are located between those approaches that accept the epistemological
framework of modern Western constitutionalism, and those that make that framework the
object of critical inquiry.
Les principaux débats critiques de l’avenir sur la constitution seront probablement—et devront
être—fort différents de ceux qui ont animé les trente premières années de la Charte. Depuis
1982, la frontière entre droit et politique, droits et utilité, et domaines public et privé ont
constitué le champ principal de contestation des chercheurs critiques. Ces frontières
délimitent toutefois désormais un panorama restreint, ce qui amène les critiques sur
le terrain d’un débat normatif qui privilégie les théories libérales et les pousse à proposer,
à tout le mieux, une forme de pragmatisme modéré. Une approche plus prometteuse
consisterait à rétablir le lien entre le débat constitutionnel et le fil socio-historique de la
théorie critique, comme le représente l’école émergente de la sociologie constitutionnelle, et
à mettre en œuvre ce rétablissement à la lumière des acquis des études postcoloniales. Les
nouvelles frontières de la constitutionnalité se situent entre ces approches qui acceptent le
cadre épistémologique du constitutionnalisme occidental moderne et celles qui font de cette
structure l’objet d’un questionnement critique.
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IN CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE, critical fears and liberal hopes
appear to combine in questioning the viability of a critical constitutional
enterprise. For critics, constitutional law is regarded as unpromising ground
from which to attack unequal power relations and to address the task of social
reconstruction. In the classic tension between the constituent power of the
demos and the power that is already constituted in institutional form, the latter is
seen as overdetermining the former, ensuring that constitutionalism remains
pre-committed to maintaining the existing order.1 From a liberal perspective,
the most trenchant account of the ideological shortcomings of prevailing
constitutional forms must ultimately address the question of the normativity
of constitutional law.2 Moreover, it is argued that doing so necessarily brings critics
inside the constitutional fold, requiring them “to engage seriously in setting
out the proper relationship between the legislature, the administration and the
judiciary.”3 On either count, the cost of constitutional engagement is a dilution
of critical ambition: In place of radical manifestos, the best we can now expect is
some version of moderate pragmatism.
These theoretical concerns have considerable resonance when we reflect upon
the thirty years since the Charter of Rights and Freedoms4 was enacted; from a critical
point of view, this anniversary is in many ways the most acute and troubling. It
is only as liberal bills of rights become embedded over the longer term that the
full scale of the critical predicament becomes apparent. This is generally obscured
during two earlier phases of critical scholarship. The first phase is characterized

1.

2.
3.
4.

See Emilios Christodoulidis, “Against Substitution: The Constitutional Thinking of
Dissensus” in Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds, The Paradox of Constitutionalism:
Constituent Power and Constitutional Form (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 189
at 191.
David Dyzenhaus, “The Left and the Question of Law” (2004) 17:1 Can JL & Jur 7
[Dyzenhaus, “The Left”].
Ibid at 30.
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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by ex ante opposition to the very idea of an entrenched bill of rights. This
opposition rests on principled and consequentialist objections to judicial, as opposed
to political, decision making. The second phase arises once the bill of rights is
in force, with critical theory operating in an “I told you so” mode, vindicating
its initial scepticism in light of the dismal record of constitutional adjudication.
However, as bright-line questions of legitimacy that critics sought to keep to
the fore gradually recede through the attrition of time, we enter a third phase in
which critics face the reality of a bill of rights as a fact of constitutional life. The
transition to the third phase crystallizes the dilemmas facing critical scholars. If
they choose—as some leading voices of the first two phases have done—to vacate
the constitutional stage, they risk irrelevance in an age of constitutional rights;
however, if they advocate an unmediated return to politics, as others appear to
do, they potentially align themselves with an unsavoury populism and with some
unlikely fellow travellers.5 According to David Dyzenhaus, the only viable option
remaining for critics is to abandon concerns about co-option and to work within
the rule of law to advance their own theory of judicial review.6
In this article, we question the conclusion that the zenith of critical
constitutionalism has passed. While agreeing with Dyzenhaus that the transition
from the second to the third phase has posed significant difficulties for critical
theorists, we offer here a different diagnosis of these problems. In particular, we
argue that the borders over which the initial theoretical encounters of the Charter
era were conducted delineated a somewhat constricted landscape—moreover, one
whose pathways led critics directly onto the horns of Dyzenhaus’s dilemma. These
borders principally marked out the opposition between legal and political forms
of constitutionalism, and while initially a fruitful source of critical inspiration,
they can now be seen as self-limiting in narrowing the scope of the constitutional
debate. This dynamic in the second phase ensured that the substantive terms of
debate in the third phase were conducive to liberal interests and that protagonists
were drawn, methodologically, onto the latter’s favoured normative terrain. These
metaphorical borders also have an important territorial dimension.7 Namely, it
is assumed without comment that these debates take place within the bounds of
modern constitutionalism as it has developed in the West—more specifically, in

5.
6.
7.

Dyzenhaus, “The Left,” supra note 2 at 8.
Ibid at 9.
I am grateful to Mark Tushnet for raising this point at the inaugural Osgoode Hall Law
Journal Symposium, “Canada’s Rights Revolution: A Critical and Comparative Symposium
on the Canadian Charter,” Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto (14
September 2012).
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the Canadian nation-state—and that this is the frame of reference within which
critical resources are to be located.
The central argument of this article is that in order to overcome the constraints
imposed by these assumptions, critical scholarship has to relocate itself to more
fertile surroundings and reorient constitutional debate around a different set of
borders. To that end, we propose two ways in which the critical perspective may
be expanded. The first is to effect a shift away from the normative preoccupation
of present-day scholars by exploring the relevance for the critical dilemma of
the recent sociological turn in the constitutional literature. This applies to
the constitutional context the (so far underdeveloped) socio-historical strand of
critical theory that seeks to “relat[e] law to underlying historical interests and
structures of power.”8 While there has been a tendency for proponents of
normative and sociological approaches to talk past each other,9 we argue here
that the interface between the two now provides a key source of critical tension.10
However, it is crucial that this methodological development also transcend the
geopolitical borders of Western constitutionalism. Thus, a second innovation
proposed here is to adapt the sociological approach by examining the ways in which
postcolonial studies can contribute to a reformulated critical constitutionalism. This
brings directly into constitutional focus the implications of the insight elaborated
by scholars such as Michael Asch and James Tully that the legacy of colonialism
implicates the metropolitan West as much as its far-flung former and present
colonies.11 As such, the crucial divide that the new borders of the constitutional
emphasize is between those who broadly accept the epistemological framework of
modern Western constitutionalism and those who seek to make that framework
the object of critical inquiry. The prospects for generating a fourth phase, which
would reinvigorate the critical project, depend on the latter repositioning itself to
the second half of this divide.
The structure of this article is as follows: Part I revisits the first thirty years
of Charter scholarship; demarcates the three phases so far of the critical variant
Alan W Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (London, UK: GlassHouse Press, 2005) at 6.
Ibid at 1. See also Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992) at 58-62.
10. See Chris Thornhill & Samantha Ashenden, eds, Legality and Legitimacy: Normative and
Sociological Approaches (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2010) at 7-12.
11. See Michael Asch, “Governmentality, State Culture and Indigenous Rights” (2007) 49:2
Anthropologica 281 at 283; James Tully, “On Law, Democracy and Imperialism” in Emilios
Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney, eds, Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits of
Constitutionalism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) 69.
8.
9.
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thereof; and sketches the borders between law and politics, rights and utility,
and the public and the private, which have been the principal focus of its
engagement. Part II locates the difficulties facing critical scholars in the wider
setting of debates within critical theory and, with reference to the key distinction
between metaphysical and socio-historical approaches, argues that the general
neglect of the latter within constitutional discourse in large part explains those
difficulties. Part III assesses the potential relevance of the emergent school of
constitutional sociology for debates in critical constitutionalism and lays out
the principal differences between that school and the normative method in
constitutional scholarship. In Part IV, we develop constitutional sociology in
the light of postcolonial studies and posit the new borders of the constitutional.

I. THE BORDERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL: FROM PHASE
ONE TO PHASE THREE
In an article published at the time of patriation, Roderick Macdonald provided
a prescient analysis of Charter scholarship’s likely course, which pays revisiting
thirty years on.12 Indeed, from our present vantage point, the article can be seen
to provide a conspectus of the past, present, and future of critical theory’s
engagement with a constitutional bill of rights. In charting the first phase of
scholarship in 1982, Macdonald observed that as the Charter’s entrenchment
became a fait accompli, pre-enactment opposition seemed to have been replaced
by a certain quiescence on the part of constitutional theorists. However,
noting that philosophical writings may take longer to gestate, he sought to assist
that process by distilling eight propositions from the pre-enactment debate as a
prelude to reformulating them as a framework for developing theoretical debate.
These propositions were:
•
•
•
•

that an entrenched Charter is an illusory guarantee of fundamental
rights;
that entrenchment is foreign to the Canadian constitutional tradition;
that an entrenched Charter is incompatible with parliamentary
supremacy;
that Charter litigation will compromise the independence and
impartiality of the courts;

12. “Postscript and Prelude – the Jurisprudence of the Charter: Eight theses” (1982) 4 Sup Ct L
Rev 321.
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•
•
•
•

that the Charter discriminates between different categories of rights;
that the Charter reinforces the power of lawyers and the ideology
of legalism;
that the Charter favours the political and economic theory of the
minimal state, and;
that the Charter provides protection for fundamental freedoms only
against encroachment by the government.13

Macdonald suggested that Charter scholarship should be carried out by
those who reject the basic premises offered both in support of and against these
propositions, and should instead embrace a via media. Thus, for example, his
analysis of the first proposition leads to the thesis that the Charter should be seen
as just one aspect of the justification of civil liberties in Canadian law, and should
not become a proxy for the need to advance a “comprehensive justification of
fundamental rights claims.”14 We will return to the significance of this approach
for the difficulties encountered by critical scholars in the third phase discussed
in the Introduction. However, it is important first to pause and reflect on the
extent to which these propositions seem to preordain the second phase of
critical scholarship. Far from the air of resignation Macdonald detected in 1982,
the decade and a half following the Charter’s passing witnessed a reinvigoration
of constitutional critique animated by, and structured around, the affirmation of
the arguments outlined above.
Overarching, and embodied to varying degrees by the propositions, are three
classic dichotomies around which the main themes of critical constitutional
scholarship have coalesced: namely those between politics and law, between
utility and rights, and between the public and the private. Taken together, these
divides establish the borders over which the opening constitutional skirmishes of
the Charter era were fought. It is the attempt to renegotiate these borders while
retaining them as the framework of inquiry that proves problematic as critical
scholarship contemplates the transition to the third phase. To place this
discussion in context, we turn now to map the principal contours of these
borders and to examine how critical theorists have positioned themselves in relation
to them.
In highlighting the divides enumerated above at the start of the Charter era,
critics sought to differentiate themselves from mainstream scholars in a number
13. Ibid at 324-25.
14. Ibid at 329.
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of important respects. First and foremost, they focused upon the relation
between the Charter and prevailing power relations in society. As such, rather
than seeing a bill of rights as largely “a legal instrument to be evaluated from
a juridical perspective,” it was regarded instead as “a political instrument to be
evaluated from an ideological perspective.”15 In contrast with scholarship that
assumed the Charter could promote justice and freedom and that concentrated
on how constitutional doctrine could better advance those ideals, the primary
objective for critics was to keep questions about the Charter’s (lack of ) legitimacy
very much to the fore.16 Thus, the distinctive feature of a critical approach is that
rather than maintaining debate within the prevailing rules—compatible with the
view that the Charter is, if not the optimum, the best available constitutional
arrangement in the circumstances—it strives to keep debate open over the rules.17
In particular, this debate considers whether this arrangement should include an
entrenched bill of rights.
Interrogation of the borders between law and politics, rights and utility, and
the private and the public was to play a pivotal role in pursuing this goal of
foregrounding the question of (il)legitimacy during the second phase of Charter
scholarship. In this connection, critics staked out a position that sought to show
that the liberal side of the border, where the emphasis was upon law, rights, and
the private, was, contrary to Charter rhetoric, supportive of hegemonic interests.
As such, rather than placing legal constraints on unacceptable political practices,
the Charter was said to entail the legalization of politics, where decision making
in the judicial arena produced victories for the already powerful that could not
necessarily have been secured through majoritarian politics.18 Moreover, critics
saw the particular form of rights-based argument employed by legalized politics
as the basis for undermining hard won advances in social welfare, which had
reversed historic power imbalances.19 Following from this, they found that the
15. Andrew Petter, The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of Constitutional Rights
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 7. See also Joel Bakan, Just Words:
Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 5
[Bakan, Just Words].
16. See Allan C Hutchinson, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 20-24 [Hutchinson, Coraf].
17. James Tully, “The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of
Constitutional Democracy” (2002) 65:2 Mod L Rev 204 at 218.
18. See Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization of Politics in Canada, revised
ed (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1994) [Mandel, Legalization of Politics].
19. For an overview of the various strains of rights scepticism, see Adam Tomkins, “Introduction:
On Being Sceptical about Human Rights” in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing & Adam Tomkins,
eds, Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 1 at 6-7. See
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importance placed on protecting the individual’s private sphere by means of legal
rights resulted in the immunization of significant concentrations of private,
especially economic, power from mechanisms of public accountability.20
The critical orientation to the law/politics, rights/utility, and private/
public divides rests first in the conviction that egalitarian understandings of
social justice are better served by the second part of each coupling. Thus, political
mobilization is preferred to litigation,21 open-ended assessments of social issues
to the “dyadic”22 reasoning of rights, and expansive conceptions of public power
to anti-statism.23 However, the critical orientation also rests in the argument that
the various separations that liberal constitutional theory seeks to draw are
incoherent. Accordingly, the liberal attempt to subject politics to law unravels
when it is understood that relocating political decisions to judicial fora does
not make them any less political. Similarly, critics attack the contrast between
principled rights adjudication and policy-oriented majoritarian decision making
by showing how consequentialist concerns inform both, giving content to the
contingent form of constitutional rights.24 They also depict the public/private
divide as arbitrary and unstable, with the public seen simultaneously as a threat
to private freedom, but also as its ultimate guarantor.25
It is important to note that while these arguments have as their ultimate
objective to reopen debate over the Charter’s legitimacy at a meta-level, they
do not together constitute some alternative meta-theory of constitutionalism;
instead, they critique particular failings of Charter jurisprudence. The ultimate
objective of this approach would presumably be realized when the accumulation
of these shortcomings reached some critical mass. Crucially though, the liberal
reply to this charge sheet has also been to respond at the level of particular
indictments rather than to revise the liberal commitment to an entrenched bill
of rights. Accordingly, in response to the attack on judicial objectivity, it adopts
the insight that the obverse of the legalization of politics is the politicization of
law.26 This insight finds expression in constitutional theories that emphasize the
also Bakan, Just Words, supra note 15.
20. Allan C Hutchinson, “Mice under a chair: Democracy, courts and the administrative state”
(1990) 40:3 UTLJ 374.
21. Harry Arthurs, “Constitutional Courage” (2003) 49 McGill LJ 1.
22. Bakan, Just Words, supra note 15 at 47.
23. Ibid.
24. Hutchinson, Coraf, supra note 16 at 35.
25. Ibid at 134-36.
26. See Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and
Politics (Oxford: Hart, 2000) at 209.
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dialogue between courts and legislatures under a bill of rights, thereby acknowledging
the necessary value-judgments involved in carving out the appropriate bounds of
judicial and legislative decision making.27 The argument that rights obscure deeply
political choices behind a priori assertions of natural law has been countered by
underscoring the inherently argumentative nature of rights adjudication within
liberal constitutionalism.28 In this vein, any priority accorded to rights is not on
account of their transcendent rationality but is only ever the revisable outcome
of liberty being weighed against competing, and on occasion normatively more
compelling, considerations, including the need to address social and economic
inequality.29 In connection with critique of the constitutional public/private
divide, this approach acknowledges that a line-drawing exercise is involved, and
so is by nature a construction. Accordingly, the task is to adduce persuasive, but
necessarily “political and temporary”30 arguments as to where the line should be
drawn, which, absent a presumption in favour of negative liberty, can also bring
about the publicization of the private.31
The point here is not to endorse these liberal responses, but to lay the
groundwork for some of the pressing issues facing critical scholarship as it
enters the third phase. This phase is characterized by a general reduction in direct
attacks on the legitimacy of entrenching rights and by a reluctant acceptance
that, notwithstanding the vigour of the critical enterprise, the Charter is now
“the only game in town.” This shift in attitudes forces critics to reflect on whether
their original hostility was to liberal constitutionalism tout court, or to its
specific instantiation in the Constitution Act, 1982. For some critics, it is important
to preserve their pristine opposition to any form of constitutionalism,32 while for
others, more fertile ground is sought at the comparative33 or transnational34 level.
For other critics though, the key consideration is pragmatic: Even if far from
ideal, rights constitutionalism cannot simply be wished away, and it remains
27. See Kent Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001).
28. David Dyzenhaus, “Recrafting the Rule of Law” in David Dyzenhaus, ed, Recrafting the Rule
of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Oxford: Hart, 1999) 1 [Dyzenhaus, Rule of Law].
29. David Dyzenhaus, “The new positivists” (1989) 39 UTLJ 361 at 368-69.
30. Ibid at 371.
31. See Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493, 156 DLR (4th) 385.
32. See Michael Mandel, “Against Constitutional Law (Populist or Otherwise)” (2000) 34 U
Rich L Rev 443 [Mandel, “Against Constitutional Law”].
33. See Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
34. David Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization: Investment Rules and
Democracy’s Promise (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
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a key site of democratic struggle.35 On this view, the question is therefore not
whether, but what constitutionalism. Moreover, to the extent that the liberal
qualifications outlined above are deemed not to satisfy the initial critical concerns
about constitutionalism’s propensity to propitiate established power,36 the third
phase can be seen to present an opportunity to develop new modes of engagement,
which can reconnect constitutional discourse to those concerns.37
The concession that the justification for judicial review does not rest in it
yielding ‘right answers’ in constitutional cases has encouraged a number of critics
to take up Dyzenhaus’s challenge, outlined in the Introduction, to demarcate the
appropriate respective jurisdiction of state institutions. However, in contrast with
liberal approaches to this issue, critics emphasize two key differences. First, the
objective is to reclaim legitimacy for legislative decision making and so to recover
some ground lost at the time of entrenchment.38 Secondly, there is an attempt to
spell out a positive conception of the courts’ role within a constitution in which
the balance has been shifted back towards legislative power—for example, that
this role should be restricted to the enforcement of “absolute” rights rather than
the interpretation of “qualified” ones.39 A further noteworthy feature of the third
phase has been the preparedness of some critics to eschew a former wariness with
regard to proffering their own account of the interpretation of constitutional
rights.40 This development seems driven by greater acceptance of the instrumentality
of rights talk41 and by the desire to steer this talk towards different—civil libertarian
or social democratic, rather than classical liberal—ends.42 One crucial avenue for
this approach is to recast the relation between rights and utility in the context of

35. Allan C Hutchinson, “The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts” in Dyzenhaus,
Rule of Law, supra note 28 at 196.
36. Petter, supra note 15 at 142-44.
37. In the following passage, we also draw on debates relating to the Human Rights Act 1998
(UK), c 42 where, perhaps due to the absence of a prolonged second phase, debate within the
third phase is most developed.
38. Petter, supra note 15 at 152-57. A corollary of Petter’s argument is that dialogism exacerbates
the courts’ lack of democratic credentials by removing, as a justification for judicial review,
the argument that judges arrive at correct decisions by applying principled reasoning: “By
accepting judicial interference with democratic decisions in the absence of such an assurance,
dialogue theory shows itself more willing to compromise democracy than its … predecessors”
(Ibid at 143).
39. Adam Tomkins, “The Role of the Courts in the Political Constitution” (2010) 60:1 UTLJ 1.
40. See e.g. Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004).
41. Conor Gearty & Virginia Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2011) at 22.
42. Ibid at 88.

ANDERSON, NEW BORDERS 747

the public/private divide43 where, for example, it has been argued that ideas of
social and economic rights should be extended into the sphere of private law in
order to address the latter’s failure to meet the demands of distributive justice.44
The liberal modifications, together with the absence of critical intensity that
characterized the second phase, may be evidence of the relative success of the
critical agenda in permeating constitutional discourse.45 No doubt the current
state of debate would be quite different without that intervention; however, here
we propose a different reading of events, namely that the move to the third phase
indicates a major shift in critical ambition. Rather than seeking to transcend the
law/politics, rights/utility, and public/private borders, the forms of engagement
outlined above reaffirm them, in the process closing down room for critical
manoeuvre. More significant than the liberal concessions is critical acceptance
of some judicial circumscription of legislative activity, some priority of rights, and
(particularly when in civil libertarian mode) some value in protecting the private
sphere. This has a number of consequences. First, it opens critics to the charge
that their previous stance against the viability of such an exercise was incoherent.46
Second, and more crucially, it moves critical argument onto the ground of its
erstwhile liberal opponents as critics now seek to redraw the borders with politics,
utility, and the public respectively, rather than to transcend them. But once
critics engage in the task of line-drawing, they are always subject to the argument
that the line could be located in a different place—for example, closer to the law/
rights/private pole. Moreover, the counter-arguments elicited maintain debate
firmly within the parameters of liberal constitutionalism, requiring a substantive
account of the very rights that were formerly the object of critique.47 Perhaps
most tellingly, the critics’ principal technique can now be deployed against them;
critique becomes a powerful weapon in liberal hands to show why, internal to the
critics’ own standards, the various lines that they themselves now propose could,
and should, be drawn differently.48
43. See Hirschl, supra note 33 at 127.
44. See Hugh Collins, “Utility and Rights in Common Law Reasoning: Rebalancing Private Law
Through Constitutionalization” (2007) 30 Dal LJ 1.
45. See Mark Tushnet, “Survey Article: Critical Legal Theory (without Modifiers) in the United
States” (2005) 13:1 J Pol Phil 99 at 100.
46. Hamish Stewart, Book Review of The Politics of the Charter: The Illusive Promise of
Constitutional Rights by Andrew Petter (2011) 61 UTLJ 540 at 542.
47. See e.g. Hirschl, supra note 33 at 126-27.
48. Alison Young’s engagement with Conor Gearty’s work, while specific to the UK context,
provides a helpful insight into the risks attendant on the critical enterprise in the third phase.
See Alison L Young, “A Peculiarly British Protection of Human Rights?” (2005) 68:5 Mod L
Rev 858.
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To be clear, the foregoing passages should not be read as criticism of those
who try to steer a difficult course in testing times. Rather, our objective has been
to invite reflection on the direction that critical scholarship has followed over the
past thirty years, on why this was the case, and on whether this could have been,
and could yet be, otherwise. In this regard, the normative turn that characterizes
the third phase could be seen as indicative of a critical resignation, affirming
Dyzenhaus’s analysis that critics will eventually return to the internal fold of the
rule of law. We will, though, contest the conclusion that the most that we can
expect, following the move to the third phase, is pragmatic moderation, rejecting
excesses of enthusiasm and scepticism, as apparently foretold by Macdonald in
1982. However, before doing so, it is important to deepen our understanding
of the nature of the difficulties facing critics upon entering the third phase by
mapping the positions taken in debates on the Charter onto some key fault lines
within critical theory more generally.

II. THE BORDERS OF CRITICAL THEORY: BETWEEN THE
METAPHYSICAL AND THE SOCIO-HISTORICAL
In adopting a perspective internal to liberal constitutionalism’s own framework of
inquiry, critical Charter scholarship follows the long-standing tradition of immanent
critique. Writing in the context of international law, Susan Marks suggests that
this approach can be distinguished from “mere ‘criticism.’”49 For Marks, the
latter evaluates facts in terms of their failure to correspond to external standards,
whereas critique “juxtaposes the immanent self-understanding of its object to
the material actuality of this object.”50 Critique seeks not just to explain, but also
to change the world by “waking it from its dream about itself.”51 The critical
constitutional stances taken up with respect to the various borders under discussion
can be characterized as directed towards that goal. Thus, the supposedly objective
nature of judicial decision making is compared to the actual political vectors
determining its outcomes.52 Against the idea that rights provide neutral baselines
49. Susan Marks, The Riddle of All Constitutions: International Law, Democracy and the Critique of
Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 25.
50. Ibid (quoting Seyla Benhabib).
51. Ibid (quoting Karl Marx).
52. Examples of this argument in the literature are too numerous to catalogue. Prominent among
them is the claim that language rights litigation should be seen as less about the protection
of individuals’ freedom of expression than about the shoring up of the interests of the
economically powerful (see Mandel, Legalization of Politics, supra note 18 at 144); or that the
Supreme Court’s ‘vulnerable groups’ doctrine often resulted in the protection of those with
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for debating competing (and presumptively valid) visions of the good society,
the substantive uses to which they are put in closing off redistributive political
options are outlined.53 Additionally, it is the courts’ attempts to demarcate the
Charter’s public zone of application from its private sphere of protection that
are deconstructed to show that any supposed bright line between the two is
inherently malleable, and could always be otherwise.54
According to Emilios Christodoulidis, the principal objective of immanent
critique should be regarded as producing “rupture,” whereby the various
contradictions identified—for example, that the liberal preference for law cannot
expunge politics from constitutional adjudication—are transcended, not clarified
or restored.55 However, as we have detailed, the story of the Charter so far has not
been one of rupture, but rather one that is fraught with the danger of critics being
“absorbed, integrated or co-opted”56 into the liberal constitutional discourse that,
in the first phase, they initially sought to oppose, and indeed to replace. This reality
may in part be attributed to a lack of tactical nous in seeking to make advances
through their opponents’ preferred mode of engagement. However, there is more
to the critical impasse reached in the third phase than liberals simply being better
versed in the art of toe-to-toe normative combat, and there is the growing suspicion
that the form of immanent critique undertaken to date itself embodies some
strategic weaknesses.
To consider what these might be, and how they could be addressed in the
present context, it is helpful to introduce a distinction drawn by Alan Norrie
between metaphysical (or ethical) and socio-historical approaches to critical
theory. His point of departure is to unpack Jacques Derrida’s account of a
“‘critique of law’ that is ‘possible and always useful.’”57 Echoing the discussion
in the Introduction, the object of this critique is to uncover “the superstructures
of law that both hide and reflect the economic and political interests of the
dominant forms of society.”58 This, for Norrie, represents the nub of a sociohistorical critical theory; in practice, though, he finds that Derrida (and others)
adopt what he describes as a “metaphysical-ethical” approach, which is more
concerned with applying deconstructive techniques to the intrinsic structures
of law. For Norrie, this “deeper critique” comes at a cost: To the extent it is

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

most economic and social power (Bakan, Just Words, supra note 15 at 98-100).
See Hirschl, supra note 33 at 153-68.
Hutchinson, Coraf, supra note 16 at 134.
Emilios Christodoulidis, “Strategies of Rupture” (2009) 20 Law & Critique 3 at 6.
Ibid at 5.
Norrie, supra note 8.
Ibid.
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developed on a stand-alone basis, it “does not relate deconstruction as an ethical
project to the ‘possible or useful’ socio-historical project.”59 His reading of the
history of critical theory is that the socio-historical approach has been—unfairly—
marginalized by its metaphysical successor.
The difficulties identified above during the third phase can in large part be
linked to critical scholarship becoming increasingly distanced from the sociohistorical approach; we canvass here what may be gained by re-establishing this
connection. That is not to say that deconstructive analyses have not been
effective weapons in the critical armoury, particularly during the second phase.
However, elevating the metaphysical approach as the principal or sole critical
modus operandi can also, more significantly, be seen as undermining attempts to
engage in the task of reconstruction. There is a tendency within critical theory for
deconstruction to be viewed as a means of critique in and of itself,60 with the
critical task achieved once a particular doctrine, such as the public/private divide,
is analytically worked over and dissected. Thus, while directed to highlighting
and disturbing the contradictions of liberal constitutionalism, there is a real risk
that the deconstructive approach in fact sustains the object of its critique. This
occurs when the frame of debate over the contradictions takes on an existence of
its own, apart from the social forces that produced them (and that they continue
to serve). In this context, the various poles of the contradictions become reified, if
not ossified, with the resultant debate oscillating between them. In other words,
in the absence of a socio-historical understanding, the metaphysical approach
can be seen as prefiguring the normative turn adopted by critics during the
third phase.
The concern underlying the foregoing is that, taken to its conclusion, the
metaphysical approach can disable attainment of the objective underpinning
immanent critique, namely to remake the world. There is an attendant danger
here of discounting narratives of social emancipation through a “celebratory
post-modernism” where the groundlessness revealed by deconstruction leads to
“disenchantment” with any reconstructive political project.61 In this regard, Norrie
commends a sociologically informed approach to legal theory, which mediates
between the “autonomisation of law” propounded by liberals and the reductionism
59. Ibid.
60. See Alan Hunt, “The Theory of Critical Legal Studies” (1986) 6:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 1
at 32.
61. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization,
And Emancipation, 2d ed (London, UK: Butterworths, 2002) at 18 [Santos, Common Sense].
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of metaphysical critique.62 On this approach, law is viewed as an historical practice
operating “through particular forms and mechanisms,” which themselves are
“related but irreducible to broader social relations.”63 This emphasis on the
specificity of law in its social setting both counters the abstraction characteristic
of the metaphysical approach and reconnects critique to the task of uncovering
alternative futures within the contingency of what the present conjuncture
“represses” as well as “represents.”64 As such, the sociological approach should
not be equated with a positive descriptivism, with the former’s critical purchase
obtained through the “ethical standpoints [that] emerge historically in society.”65
Moreover, it counsels against erecting a sharp divide between discourse and
practice and instead regards the theoretical and the social as “inseparably
intertwined,” with ideas and the prevailing economic and social conditions
constituting a mutually productive relationship.66
In the remainder of this article, we consider the implications of extending the
socio-historical approach to critical theory in the specific context of debates
on constitutionalism. We suggest that the new borders of the constitutional
will not be formed by drawing fresh lines across familiar territory, but will
rather be staked out over quite different ground. Applying the sociological method
enables us to interrogate how far the critical assault on liberal constitutionalism
left unexamined—because it shared them—a number of crucial assumptions
about the framework for conducting constitutional debate. A major consequence
of this line of inquiry is to undermine the presumed singularity of the
normative enterprise: As a result, the key question for debate shifts from what
constitutionalism?—a question decided by competition amongst normative
principles—to why constitutionalism?—a question requiring “sociological
explanations of the grammar of legitimacy in constitutional laws.”67 This crucial
move, it will be argued, lays the foundations for the fourth phase of critical
constitutional scholarship, which reconnects with the original, transformative
motivations of critical theory. Moreover, redirecting our focus to this
question shows that the scope of the fourth phase is necessarily broader than
Norrie, supra note 8 at 29.
Ibid at 30.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 6-7.
Ibid at 19. Norrie elaborates that the intellectual ideas of any given period are themselves
“mediated and redirected according to the preoccupations of the here and now” (ibid at 20).
67. Jiří Přibáň, “Constitutionalism as Fear of the Political? A Comparative Analysis of Teubner’s
Constitutional Fragments and Thornhill’s A Sociology of Constitutions” (2012) 39:3 JL & Soc’y
441 at 458 [Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis”].
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
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before, no longer addressing the role that constitutional discourse plays in
particular Western societies, but also its wider geopolitical context. To set
the groundwork for this argument, we now advert to some recent pioneering
scholarship, which has sought to map out the implications of the sociological
method for constitutional theory.

III. CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY
Over the past few years, an innovative body of research has emerged, which for
some embodies a distinct school of “constitutional sociology,”68 and which has
gone some way to redirecting the inquiry to what it is about constitutionalism
that explains its continuing salience for the distribution of power in society. This
school self-consciously differentiates itself from the normative deductivism
associated with Enlightenment theorists of constitutionalism, and so rejects the
idea that the primary task of the constitutional scholar is to rationalize those
principles that best govern the operation of political institutions, their relations
with each other, and with citizens. While this deductivist approach was the
predominant mindset of the post-1945 explosion of constitutionalism, it is said
to hinder comprehension of the motivation behind the enduring recourse to
the constitutional form as a means of “producing, restricting and refining”69
political power. Enhancing this understanding, according to Christopher Thornhill,
recovers a “proto-sociological perspective,” which raises the “most profound questions”
about “the political conclusions that supported the normative doctrines of the
Enlightenment.”70 Thus, against the ostensible triumph of liberal normativism,
there may be another story to be told.
Adopting a functionalist outlook, Thornhill attributes the appeal and
longevity of constitutions to
their efficacy in enabling societies at once objectively and positively to reflect and
control the differentiation of their diverse spheres of social exchange, and to simplify
and consistently to distinguish the complexly interwoven functions resulting from
their differentiated and pluralized evolutionary form.71

68. Chris Thornhill, A Sociology of Constitutions: Constitutions and State Legitimacy in HistoricalSociological Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 3 [Thornhill,
Sociology].
69. Ibid at 11.
70. Ibid at 1-2.
71. Ibid at 13.
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On this basis, the history of constitutionalism is viewed through processes of
abstraction and generalization of political power, and through its consequent
transmission into positive (public) law and formal declarations of rights. Crucially
though, this provides a quite different account of constitutional legitimacy to that
preferred by normative constitutional theory. Here, legitimacy does not depend upon
the consonance between political action and an ex ante list of rational precepts.72
Instead, the legitimacy of constitutional law is inherently contingent, necessarily ex
post, and attained to the extent that it “facilitates the processes of political abstraction,
generalization, selective de-politicization and positivization,” which provide the
conditions under which political power can function efficiently.73
We can develop a number of points of interest to the present discussion
from the sociological turn. First, insofar as sociological analyses emphasize that
constitutional structures have emerged in response to various societal needs and
pressures, this Part questions whether it is coherent, as some critics suggest, to
see constitutionalism and politics as a zero-sum game in terms of the prospects
for procuring progressive change.74 Regarding “constitutions as institutions of
structural coupling between law and politics”75 implies that giving up on
constitutionalism also entails giving up on politics. In other words, as an integral
part of our collective engagement with social life, the constitutional may
be inescapable. Moreover, hegemonic forces are always ready to occupy any
constitutional ground that may be vacated.
Second, the sociological method illustrates how normative approaches
undermine the initial critical concern with constitutionalism and power by
distorting the nature of this relationship. Constitutional sociology focuses
attention on the “functional reality” of political power to emphasize that
the latter cannot be reduced solely to semantic, theoretical constructions.76
Rather, there is always a “paradoxical displacement between power and the
concepts and institutions in which it is vested”; accordingly, we should be
wary of those normative approaches that regard themselves as providing
“external and objectively valid descriptions of power and its legitimacy.”77
72. See Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 464.
73. Chris Thornhill, “Legality, legitimacy and the constitution: A historical-functionalist
approach” in Thornhill & Ashenden, supra note 10 at 53.
74. See Mandel, “Against Constitutional Law,” supra note 32.
75. Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 466.
76. Chris Thornhill, “The Future of the State” in Poul F Kjaer, Gunther Teubner & Alberto
Febbrajo, eds, The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional
Differentiation (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 357 at 373.
77. Ibid.
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These insights appear to direct a renewed critical constitutional project away
from elaborating the normative principles that should guide political conduct
and towards a genealogical study of power.78 Thus, a sociological approach is
attuned to the ways in which power operates through constitutional discourse,
and in particular to how the conceptual structures generated by normative
theories are themselves articulations internal to power, reinforcing the
connections between the theoretical and the social discussed above in this Part.
Thirdly, a sociological approach potentially reconnects constitutional
scholarship with the distributive aspects of power while avoiding some of the
pitfalls of the normativist approach encountered during the third phase. It should
be emphasized again that constitutional sociology is not simply concerned with
description for its own sake. Rather, moving from the study of “constitutions in
society” to “the constitution of society”79 focuses attention on how the latter
distributes power and resources in an asymmetrical manner between a
“generating centre” and a “receiving periphery.”80 However, any “value consensus”
proposed or imposed by the centre is potentially limited in its validity.81 In this
way, the sociological method highlights the danger that the “self-legitimation
of power through its constitutionalization” might become part of the “general
tendency to self-justification” and so a means of rationalizing and ratifying the
status quo.82 In this regard, while eschewing normative approaches in general,
Thornhill nonetheless warns that the “re-patrimonialisation of state power” is an
enduring risk faced by society, which, if not checked, would lead to a signal loss
of freedom.83 Jiří Přibáň, though, suggests that this stance should not be seen as
contradictory, but rather as following from the sociological method itself, and
the method’s emphasis on the dynamic nature of constitutional norms
producing necessarily contingent outcomes. As such, only constitutional sociology
can account for the apparent paradox of (some) societies producing high levels
of liberty while at the same time presiding over ever-greater concentrations of
power.84 Thus, constitutional sociology relocates questions of validity to analysis
of “the outcome of the societal functions of normative political forms.”85
78. See Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 467.
79. Ibid at 465 [emphasis in original].
80. Jiří Přibáň, ‘‘Multiple Sovereignty: On Europe’s Self-Constitutionalization and Legal SelfReference’’ (2010) 23:1 Ratio Juris 41 at 51.
81. Ibid.
82. Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 470.
83. Thornhill, supra note 76 at 387.
84. Přibáň, “Comparative Analysis,” supra note 67 at 464.
85. Ibid at 465.
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By encouraging reflection on the limited utility of the normative turn for
critical scholarship, constitutional sociology provides an important start in gaining
perspective on the difficulties encountered in transiting from the second to the
third phase. However, there remains concern as to whether this scholarship, as
it currently stands, is able to ground the development of a fourth phase that
transcends these limitations. This concern rests on two related considerations.
First, while the sociological method is to be welcomed in shifting the object
of critical inquiry to concrete outcomes, to the extent that its analysis of these
outcomes is refracted through examination of the social motives that produced
the particular institutions of contemporary society, it is potentially circular and
self-referential.86 Thus, while it does not shy away from discussing the validity
of constitutionalism’s contingent outcomes, the criteria by which this is to be
assessed are somewhat elusive, leading to disquiet that the deeply political
dimension of this enterprise is lost beneath a discourse of efficiency. Secondly,
it is striking that in the present literature the focus of sociological inquiry
rests almost exclusively upon the development of Western constitutionalism.
Even when addressing the global context,87 there is a very palpable sense that
this is an extension of constitutional discourse as it originated in the Western
nation-state.88
What is generally underdeveloped in this analysis is the extent to which the
history of Western constitutionalism can be told as a “story of expansion through
imperialism,” which in practice entailed the exclusion of “the oppressed voices of
non-Western cultures.”89 As a result, missing from the discussion is the rich vein
of scholarship motivated by what it sees as this mindset continuing today, and
which, with reference to insurgent developments in the global South, argues that
the key to “reinvent[ing] social emancipation” lies in going “beyond the critical
theory produced in the North.”90 In the following Part, we assess the potential

86. See Thornhill, Sociology, supra note 68 at 7.
87. See David Sciulli, “Societal constitutionalism: Procedural legality and legitimation in global
and civil society” in Thornhill & Ashenden, supra note 10 at 103.
88. See Gavin W Anderson, “Beyond ‘Constitutionalism Beyond the State’” (2012) 39:3 JL &
Soc’y 359 at 370.
89. Hauke Brunkhorst, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in the World Society” in Petra
Dobner & Martin Loughlin, eds, The Twilight of Constitutionalism? (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2010) 179 at 179.
90. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “From the Postmodern to the Postcolonial – and Beyond Both”
in Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Manuela Boatcă & Sérgio Costa, eds, Decolonizing
European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010) 225 at 227.
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rewards to be gained by orienting the fourth phase of critical scholarship around
an openness to learning from the global South.

IV. TOWARDS PHASE FOUR: CONSTITUTIONAL SOCIOLOGY
IN POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVE
There is a tendency within mainstream constitutional discourse, if not to treat
colonialism as pertaining to a different time and place, then to regard its legacy
as raising questions of a highly specialized nature of interest primarily to those
seeking to accommodate cultural diversity. This approach, though, has been the
subject of a sustained challenge within postcolonial studies, which emphasizes
that modernity should not be regarded as something that originated in the West
and was brought from there to its colonies, but rather was itself created and given
meaning through the colonial experience.91 Moreover, in order to understand the
artefacts of Western modernity, not least constitutionalism, engagement with the
colonial must no longer be seen as marginal but as “unavoidable.”92 According to
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the present global age marks a “return of the colonial,”
both through the latter’s renewed connections with metropolitan societies, but
also, perhaps more significantly, as a result of its increasing presence within these
societies.93 He warns that so long as critical theory retains a narrow, Westernfocused viewpoint and fails to give these developments sufficient weight, it risks
missing some of the key “transformative practices going on in the world.”94 Thus,
91. Peter Fitzpatrick & Eve Darian-Smith, “Laws of the Postcolonial: An Insistent Introduction”
in Eve Darian-Smith & Peter Fitzpatrick, eds, Laws of the Postcolonial (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1999) 1 at 2.
92. Walter D Mignolo, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference” (2002)
101:1 S Atlantic Q 57 at 86.
93. “Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledges” (2007) 30:1
Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 45 at 55 [Santos, “Abyssal”]. Santos gives as an example
of the former “the case of the undocumented migrant worker … hired by one of hundreds
of thousands of sweatshops operating in the Global South subcontracted by metropolitan
multinational corporations.” The latter is manifested by a redrawing of the line between the
metropolitan and the colonial in response to the colonial “intruding or trespassing on the
metropolitan spaces” as a result of the former’s now “superior” mobility compared with previous
eras. Examples of this line drawing are given as the segregation wall in Gaza, and the development
of the category of the “unlawful enemy combatant” (ibid at 56, references omitted). Santos
acknowledges that what emerges is a somewhat “messy cartography” (ibid at 57).
94. “Public Sphere and Epistemologies of the South” (2012) 37:1 Africa Dev’t 43 at 48. Thus,
while sociological analyses have highlighted the ways in which globalization has reinforced
hegemonic power relations between North and South, and the role which the spread of
liberal constitutional forms has played in those processes (see Santos, Common Sense, supra
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at the heart of postcolonial theory is a call for an “understanding of the world
[that] by far exceeds the Western understanding of the world.”95 Adapting this
to the present context, we argue in this final Part that any sociology of
constitutionalism, if it is to contribute to a reformulated critical constitutional
project, must be located within a sociology of Western modernity itself. This
brings into sharp focus the crucial issue, laid bare once we begin to question
the necessary equation of constitutionalism with Western constitutionalism, of
what is at stake in the division drawn by predominant forms of constitutional
discourse between the constitutional and the non-constitutional.
We can approach the implications of adverting to postcolonial studies for
critical constitutional theory through the work of Partha Chatterjee on the
genealogy of political society. In an echo of Macdonald telling backwards the
history of critical debate under the Charter, Chatterjee suggests that “it is as
if all the major political developments of the modern world were anticipated,
indeed foretold, at the birth of modern political theory.”96 This is reinforced by
a “historicizing strategy,” in which politics is conceptualized within a singular
worldview, regarded as the same everywhere, and taking place simultaneously.97
This “homogeneous time” is the time-space of Western modernity and is
characterized by abstraction: It is what people imagine, not where they live. In
contrast, the time that people actually experience is “heterogeneous, unevenly
dense.”98 For Chatterjee, the puzzle is the durability of the abstract normative
theory of empty homogeneous time, notwithstanding the intense struggles over,
for example, class conflict and colonialism, which have marked the “real history”
of past centuries.99
Chatterjee finds part of the answer in the development of “norm-deviation
and norm-exception structures,” which sought to retain the universalist narrative
of modernity while adapting to the fact of social plurality. The norm-deviation
structure operated at the level of empirical comparison of a particular social

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

note 61 at 313-51), they have at the same time drawn attention to ongoing practices of
resistance, and have sought to engineer a reverse transmission of global power, often captured
under the rubric of “globalization from below.” See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & César A
Rodríguez-Garavito, eds, Law and Globalization from Below: Towards a Cosmopolitan Legality
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
Santos, “Abyssal,” supra note 93 at 64.
Partha Chatterjee, Lineages of Political Society: Studies in Postcolonial Democracy (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2011) at 2 [Chatterjee, Lineages].
Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the
World (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004) at 6.
Ibid at 7.
Supra note 96 at 3.
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exemplar to a notional mean, while the norm-exception structure informed
policy, including the possibility of intervention to redress the initial deviation.100
The colonial context is the key to understanding these structures. For example,
not extending representative government to colonial dependencies would not
contradict representative government’s status as a universal ideal so long as its
absence could be attributed to the colonies’ exceptional characteristics (such as
their lack of readiness for such government at this stage in their history).101
Homogeneous time maps onto the assumption that modernity should develop
in a symmetrical fashion, closing down the gap identified by the norm-deviation
strategy, while heterogeneous time implies a sequential theory of development
in which the various processes that occurred in Western history need not be
replicated in other places.102
Applying Chatterjee’s analysis to constitutional sociology in its current form,
we can locate within the latter an understanding of the development of Western
constitutionalism in symmetrical terms. Thus, for example, Thornhill’s historical
narrative is one of the unfolding of legal constraints on arbitrary official conduct,
leading to political power being organized in ever more functional terms. But
Chatterjee’s point is that for most inhabitants of the planet most of the time,
the sequential theory corresponds to their way of life. This reality in fact
raises general levels of arbitrariness as, in response to the pressures of popular
politics, the persistence of norm-deviation strategies has by now accumulated
a large number of exceptions.103 Whereas the symmetrical approach sees this
proliferation of exceptions as a “perversion” of democratic politics, a sequential
perspective takes it very seriously indeed (as a “potentially richer development
of democracy”104), and views the “theorization of these improvisations” as a core
task of postcolonial scholarship.105 For Chatterjee, bringing to light the depth
and extent of “the real heterogeneity of power relations in society” is central to
“break[ing] the abstract homogeneity of the mythical time-space of Western
normative theory.”106 The new borders of the constitutional in the twenty-first
century accordingly coalesce around attitudes to the framework of Western
modernity, and in particular whether constitutionalism is seen as developing in
a teleological manner along the lines suggested by the symmetrical account, or
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Ibid at 10-11.
Ibid at 10.
Ibid at 12.
Ibid at 19.
Ibid at 15.
Ibid at 19.
Ibid at 22-23.
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whether that assumption itself should be subject to challenge and scrutiny.
The constitutional position of Indigenous peoples in settler societies such
as Canada provides a powerful example of the critical potential of the second
option in highlighting the partiality underlying Western constitutionalism’s
impetus towards symmetry. In an insightful and helpful analysis, Michael Asch
investigates the legitimacy narratives of the present-day Canadian state. Adopting
Foucauldian terminology, he identifies the major problem these narratives have
had to overcome as the longer-standing “historical-political” discourse of
Canada’s original inhabitants, the First Nations.107 The attempt to do so rests
on two bases, he argues, by combining the “juridical-philosophical” principle
of majority rule (“deduced through ‘Reason’” according to the tenets of the
Enlightenment) with a reformulation of historical-political discourse to claim
that Canada was not occupied by political society before European settlement.108
Both find practical expression in the terra nullius doctrine, which continues to
ground the sovereignty of the Crown. In other words, Canada’s “origin myth” is
restarted so that it can unfold within the homogeneous time of Western modernity.
However, as Asch points out, the alternative, and for him more compelling, First
Nations historical-political discourse continues to get in the way,109 and alongside
the hegemonizing sway of modern constitutionalism is a story of “resist[ance
to] the colonial positioning proffered for us, as citizens and academics, by the
liberal state.”110 The emergence of a distinct theory and practice of Indigenous
constitutionalism has in this regard provided an important focus for confronting
assumptions about the singular nature of Western constitutionalism by
highlighting the latter’s sequential origins through its encounter with non-modern
constitutional traditions in colonized lands.111
It is important to realize that this challenge to the symmetrical reading of
constitutionalism goes beyond the immediate postcolonial context. In that
regard, there is much for reflection in Asch’s observation that “it will likely
prove impossible to create a just relationship with First Nations without also
decolonizing ourselves.”112 This statement suggests that a principal objective of
critical constitutional theory is to uncover other ways in which the assumptions of
107. Supra note 11 at 282.
108. Ibid at 281-82.
109. For example, Asch notes that Indigenous peoples have remained “reliant for their livelihood
on the foraging mode of production” so “put[ting] to rest forever the truth-claim proffered by
government and capital that they [have] been absorbed by the world economy” (ibid at 283).
110. Ibid.
111. See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010).
112. Supra note 11.
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uniform societal development underpinning Western modernity (not least
the view that liberal capitalism represents the optimum form of socio-economic organization) also produce highly partial constitutional logics. Building
on ideas of legal pluralism,113 this approach highlights the power of naming what
is habitually excluded, and of positing this as an integral aspect of constitutional
discourse. We can see the potential value of this approach in the context of contemporary economic globalization, which critical constitutional analyses have
characterized as a drive towards worldwide uniformity of neoliberal political and
economic models.114 However, expanding the constitutional canon to include
those normally marginalized brings widespread practices of resistance, often located outside institutional milieu, into the picture,115 showing that as well as its
top-down, hegemonic dimension given priority in the literature, global constitutionalism can also operate in a bottom-up, insurgent mode.116
To return to Dyzenhaus’s dilemma, we can now see that the old borders,
which he assumes as the necessary framework for debate, do not exhaust the
options for critical scholars. Accordingly, the new borders of the constitutional
proposed here stake out a broader conception of constitutionalism implied by its
alternative histories, as outlined above. The task of harnessing this conception to
a different constitutional future is neither easy nor straightforward; the critical
dilemma retains its power by speaking to deeply embedded ideas in the Western
constitutional mindset. Moreover, since what is being recovered is itself a
critique of the existing vocabulary of Western political and constitutional
theory, we cannot resort to a further refinement of its well-established principles.
Doing so would undo the advances of constitutional sociology. Chatterjee
himself suggests a potential way of reconciling wariness over the normative
nature of constitutional discourse with critique of the power relations sustained
by dominant readings of Western modernity within that discourse. He asks,
“Could the accumulation of exceptions justify a redefinition of the norm?”117
In that regard, a critical research agenda in part seeks to overcome the limits of
113. See e.g. Martha-Marie Kleinhans & Roderick A Macdonald, “What is a Critical Legal
Pluralism?” (1997) 12:2 CJLS 25. In an interesting coda to the earlier discussion, it is
noteworthy that Macdonald’s scholarly trajectory since his 1982 article on the Charter itself
reflects a sociological turn, and has played a leading role in bringing to light the asymmetries
endemic in “everyday law.” See Macdonald, Lessons of Everyday Law (Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2002).
114. See Schneiderman, supra note 34.
115. See Santos & Rodríguez-Garavito, supra note 94.
116. See Anderson, supra note 88 at 380-83.
117. Lineages, supra note 96 at 24.
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exclusively institutional analyses by depicting the actual practices of governance
where colonial and postcolonial struggles are played out.118 It also addresses the
possibilities of valorizing the asymmetrical and the marginal within current
institutional fora; there may be much to be learned in this regard from recent
developments in Latin America where courts are seen by social activists as one
(sometimes useful) tool among many in advancing their various struggles.119
Thus, it is the fact of divergence from the norm assumed by Western theory,
not the norm itself, which provides the basis for evaluating the ‘validity’ of the
contingent outcomes of modern constitutionalism.

V. CONCLUSION
Over twenty years ago, while commenting on critical scholarship’s general
distrust of normative legal argument, Mark Tushnet suggested that normative
discourse could one day be replaced by “something like sociology.”120 In this
article, we have taken up Tushnet’s challenge, to argue that a sociological outlook
is vital to the task of renewing critical constitutional theory in demanding times.
This argument highlights the imperative of repositioning critical theory around
new borders of the constitutional that bring to the fore the question of what
was not debated within the old borders that can now be included within the new.
This entails an appraisal of the extent to which critical theory had previously
assumed a framework of inquiry that left in place the hegemonic reading of
Western modernity. Perhaps the most striking feature of debate under the old
borders was the belief, by liberals and critics alike, in modernity as “the story of
reason circumscribing power,”121 and in the ability of constitutional law to bring
this about, once fastened to the requisite normative co-ordinates. If such an
approach reinforced a singular account of modernity, then the pressing challenge
for critical theory is to bring to light developments that reflect ideas of multiple,
or even counter, modernities. One such opportunity takes up Chatterjee’s
observation that “differentiated citizenship” is now empirically the norm for most
societies, even in the West.122 For some, the attendant move away from modernist
conceptions of political equality is not a cause for concern or regret but to be
118. See Asch, supra note 11 at 283.
119. See César Rodríguez-Garavito, “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Tex L Rev 1669 at 1676.
120. Mark V Tushnet, “The Left Critique of Normativity: A Comment” (1992) 90:8 Mich L Rev
2325 at 2330.
121. Shai Lavi, Yishai Blank & Roy Kreitner, “Introduction” (2007) 8:1 Theor Inq L 1 at 1.
122. Supra note 96 at 24.
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welcomed as an opening in rights discourse towards “the exploited, the excluded,
the nonequals.”123 Another promising avenue is the potential role of globalization
from below in providing the elusive agency for transformative constitutional
practice.124 The precise direction in which this takes us will be established in
the years to come; however, it is clear that for any critical constitutional project
to flourish, it is important that this takes us beyond the “confines of modern
constitutionalism.”125

123. Enrique Dussel, Twenty Theses on Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) at 122.
124. See e.g. Santos, Common Sense, supra note 61 at 465-71.
125. David T ButleRitchie, “The Confines of Modern Constitutionalism” (2004) 3:1 Pierce L Rev 1.

